Monbo v. United States

DEE MONBO, Owings Mills, MD, pro se.

KRISTIN ELAINE OLSON, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE; STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM in Appeal Nos. 2025-1947, 2025-1958; ALBERT S. IAROSSI in Appeal No. 2025-2007.

This case considers three appeals by Dee Monbo challenging actions taken by contracting officers in government procurement. As is relevant here, Ms. Monbo and the corporation she controls, Monbo Group International (collectively, “the Monbo contractors”), submitted proposals for multiple government contracts; one was awarded to the Monbo contractors but subsequently canceled, while the others were not awarded to the Monbo contractors. Ms. Monbo filed bid protests in the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”).

In 2023, before the cases were filed in the Claims Court, Ms. Monbo was debarred pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”). Monbo Group International was also debarred. The consequence of the debarments was to prevent Ms. Monbo and Monbo Group International from receiving an award of government contracts. Ms. Monbo brought suit in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the debarments. The district court rejected her claims, and Ms. Monbo’s appeal thereof was dismissed for lack of prosecution.

The Claims Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Ms. Monbo’s debarment meant that she lacked constitutional standing and statutory standing. In the case underlying appeal No. 2025-2007, the Claims Court issued an anti-filing injunction against Ms. Monbo because of her filing multiple frivolous lawsuits.

We conclude that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction because of the debarment, and that the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an anti-filing injunction. We affirm.

Ms. Monbo operates as a sole proprietor and has registered that sole proprietorship as a government contractor.

Ms. Monbo also controls a corporation known as Monbo Group International, which is also registered as a government contractor. In 2019, Ms. Monbo and Monbo Group International (collectively, “the Monbo contractors”) signed a “joint collaboration agreement” with one another. In the three decisions on appeal, the Claims Court held that Claims Court Rule 83.1(a)(3)¹ prevented Ms. Monbo from bringing a pro se action on behalf of the corporate entity Monbo Group International. Ms. Monbo does not challenge this on appeal. The appeal concerns only Ms. Monbo’s claims as a sole proprietor.

In case No. 2025-1958, the Monbo contractors submitted a purported joint proposal on October 12, 2022, in response to an Air Force solicitation. The Air Force awarded the contract to another firm and did not consider the Monbo contractors’ proposal because the Monbo contractors failed to respond to an amendment to the solicitation. Ms. Monbo filed a protest with the Claims Court.

In case No. 2025-1947, the Monbo contractors submitted purported joint offers on October 20, 2023, to the General Services Administration (“GSA”) responding to two solicitations. In September 2024, the GSA informed Ms. Monbo that the Monbo contractors did not receive an award under either solicitation. The GSA selected 309 firms for the first solicitation but did not select the Monbo contractors because the Monbo contractors’ proposal was still under review. The GSA made no award under the second solicitation. On October 17, 2024, Ms. Monbo filed a protest relating to both GSA solicitations with the Claims Court.

In case No. 2025-2007, on January 21, 2023, the Air Force’s Medical Education Training Center awarded Monbo Group International a five-year contract consisting of one base year and four optional one-year extensions. On February 21, 2024, the Air Force notified Monbo Group International that it intended to exercise the second option year from February 2025 through January 2026. However, on August 16, 2024, the Air Force provided notice that it no longer intended to exercise the second option year; no reason for that decision was provided. Ms. Monbo contends that this decision was made because of an unrelated bid protest she had filed against the Air Force. On February 20, 2025, Ms. Monbo filed a protest relating to these actions with the Claims Court.

1Following a July 2025 amendment, the substance of this rule now appears in Rule 83.1(a)(4).

Concurrently, on March 21, 2023, the Navy commenced debarment proceedings. Ms. Monbo received a show-cause letter from the Navy in which the Navy’s Acquisition Integrity Office requested that Ms. Monbo respond to allegations that Monbo Group International had “provided a falsified past performance questionnaire” and “invoiced [the Navy] for a vacant administrative position for several months and ha[d] refused to reimburse [the Navy] for overpayment.” Administrative R. at AR-000001 to AR-000002, Monbo v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, No. 24-cv-2547, (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2025) ECF No. 70. Ms. Monbo did not provide a substantive response to these allegations. The Navy later determined that both allegations were true and issued the Monbo contractors a notice of proposed debarment on October 20, 2023, followed by a notice of debarment on November 29, 2023. As a result of the debarment, the Monbo contractors were excluded from receiving future government contracts. See FAR 9.405(a).

Ms. Monbo challenged the debarments under the Administrative Procedure Act in the District Court for the District of Columbia; the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. See generally Monbo v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 24-cv-2547, 2025 WL 2757807 (D.D.C. Sept 26, 2025). Ms. Monbo appealed, but that ap-

peal was dismissed for lack of prosecution by the D.C. Circuit. Monbo v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, No. 25-5344, 2026 WL 893688, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 2026).

In the period following the district court’s decision declining to set aside the debarments, the Claims Court dismissed all three protests. In Nos. 2025-1947 and 2025-1958, the protests were dismissed on three alternative grounds: that Ms. Monbo lacked constitutional standing, that she lacked statutory standing (both based on the debarment), and that she had failed to prosecute her claims. In case No. 2025-2007, the protest was dismissed on three alternative grounds: that Ms. Monbo lacked constitutional standing, that she lacked statutory standing, and that the prior Claims Court decisions precluded her from relitigating the standing issues.

The order dismissing the protest in case No. 2025-2007 also imposed an anti-filing injunction on Ms. Monbo, requiring her to seek leave of the Chief Judge of the Claims Court before filing any pro se cases. The court based its anti-filing injunction on the fact that Ms. Monbo had then filed thirty-nine federal cases, at least ten of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court also noted that other cases from Ms. Monbo had “been dismissed for improper litigation behavior, such as failing to comply with court orders.” Monbo v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 177, 184 (2025).

Ms. Monbo appeals separately from each of the three Claims Court decisions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

Ms. Monbo presents numerous issues across these three appeals. Many of these issues are facially without

merit or irrelevant to our disposition of the case.² We address only Ms. Monbo’s primary arguments.

I

First, Ms. Monbo argues that she has constitutional and statutory standing.

When a contractor has been debarred, it is “excluded from receiving contracts, and agencies shall not solicit offers from, award contracts to, or consent to subcontracts with [the debarred contractor], unless the agency head determines there is a compelling reason for such action.”³ FAR 9.405(a). A challenge “to review the propriety of an agency’s decision to debar a contractor . . . must be brought in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act.” IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

The Monbo contractors have been debarred from government contracting. Until and unless the debarment is set aside, government agencies are therefore prohibited from awarding contracts to either entity.

Ms. Monbo, however, argues she has standing because of preclusive effects from a prior ruling by the District Court for the District of Columbia in a separate case allegedly finding that Ms. Monbo was an “interested party” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), and that this finding should bind the agencies or the Claims Court. In fact, the District Court expressly declined to decide that issue. Monbo v. United States, No. 23-cv-02425, 2023 WL 8354885, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2023) (“[T]he Court need not decide whether Monbo is an ‘interested party’ to conclude that [the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act] deprives it of subject-matter jurisdiction over her bid-protest claims.”). As discussed above, in another related districtcourt case, the court rejected Ms. Monbo’s challenges to her debarment.

2Many of these arguments were also presented and rejected in another appeal. See generally Monbo v. United States, No. 25-1489, 2026 WL 1379146 (Fed. Cir. May 15, 2026).

3Contractors debarred under FAR 9.405(a) can seek a waiver from an agency head for a “compelling reason” and be awarded a contract. Ms. Monbo does not allege that she or Monbo Group International has sought or secured such a waiver.

Second, Ms. Monbo contends that the debarment did not extend to subcontracts with a value under $35,000. The version of the FAR in effect at the time of the Monbo contractors’ debarment and the Claims Court litigation included this provision:

Contractors are prohibited from entering into any subcontract in excess of $35,000 . . . with a contractor that has been debarred . . . unless there is a compelling reason to do so. If a contractor intends to enter into a subcontract in excess of $35,000 . . . with a party that is debarred, . . . a corporate officer or designee of the contractor is required . . . to notify the contracting officer, in writing, before entering into such subcontract.

FAR 9.405-2(b) (2025).⁴

The FAR further provides that “contracting officers shall not consent to subcontracts with such contractors unless the agency head states in writing the compelling reasons for this approval action.” FAR 9.405-2(a) (2026). These provisions operate to exclude a prime contractor from using debarred subcontractors to complete major parts of the contract without the government’s consent. These provisions are inapplicable because Ms. Monbo is not a subcontractor on the procurements in this appeal. Third, Ms. Monbo contends that the Claims Court erred by ruling without the full administrative record. We note that the Claims Court dismissed her complaints for failure to sufficiently allege that the court had jurisdiction in her complaint. See Associated Energy Grp., LLC v. United States, 131 F.4th 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2025). The full administrative record was not needed to determine the jurisdictional issue because it is undisputed that Ms. Monbo was debarred.

4This provision was subsequently modified and now applies to subcontracts in excess of $45,000. FAR 9.405-2(b) (2026).

II

Finally, Ms. Monbo argues that the anti-filing injunction against her is improper. We review the Claims Court’s use of its sanctions for abuse of discretion. Allen v. United States, 88 F.4th 983, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2023). In Allen, we held that an anti-filing injunction requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 988. Here, the Claims Court complied with our requirement that Ms. Monbo be given notice and an opportunity to be heard by issuing a show-cause order and considering Ms. Monbo’s response. Additionally, the Claims Court made numerous findings supporting its conclusion that Ms. Monbo was a vexatious and frivolous litigant. Given Ms. Monbo’s record of litigation behavior, we cannot say that the Claims Court abused its discretion in issuing the anti-filing injunction.

However, Ms. Monbo contends the Claims Court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the order. These sanctions are part of the “inherent power” of the federal courts, which are not dependent on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying proceeding. See id. at 986–87 (affirming dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but evaluating sanctions independently from jurisdiction); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992) (affirming a federal court’s power to impose

Rule 11 sanctions despite a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying case).

Ms. Monbo’s personal-jurisdiction argument was not made in response to the show-cause order below and is thus forfeited. In any event, personal jurisdiction involves the court’s power over defendants. See Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., 145 S. Ct. 2090, 2102–03 (2025). By bringing suit in the Claims Court, Ms. Monbo voluntarily subjected herself to the personal jurisdiction of the court.

We have considered Ms. Monbo’s other arguments and find them without merit.

AFFIRMED

Costs to the United States.